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Patents, R&D, and Market
Structure in the U.S.
Food Processing Industry
Munisamy Gopinath and Utpal Vasavada
This study investigates the effects of market structure and research and develop-
ment (R&D) on the innovative  activities of firms.  Fixed and random effects  count
data models are estimated with firm-level data for the U.S. food processing industry.
Results  show  a positive  association between  patents  and R&D, and patents  and
market structure, suggesting that firms which exhibit noncompetitive behavior are
likely to develop new products and processes.  Significant intra-industry  spillovers
of  knowledge are identified using industry R&D. For this industry, deadweight losses
from imperfect competition may be offset by greater product variety and quality of
food products  for consumers.
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Introduction
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of market structure and research and
development (R&D) on innovations in the U.S. food processing industry. A number of
studies  have found that market structure  in this industry is oligopolistic  in nature,
thereby causing welfare (deadweight) losses to society.1 The focus on welfare losses has
masked the possibility that at least a portion of the revenue  (extra profits) earned by
marking up prices  over and above  marginal  costs may be  reinvested to  create new
products and processes (Helpman and Krugman). When firms invest a portion of their
extra profits toward development  of new products and processes, the potential welfare
losses  due  to noncompetitive  behavior  likely will  be  overstated  because  consumers
eventually  enjoy a payback in the form of greater product variety and better product
quality.
The relationship between market structure and innovation is not completely under-
stood because a problem arises with regard to the nature of the knowledge generated
(i.e., new products  and processes) (Baldwin and Scott). While knowledge is a nonrival
good, a firm's incentive  to generate new knowledge  crucially depends on its (partial)
excludability (Grossman and Helpman). If the new products and processes can be easily
imitated by rival firms, then markets fail in the sense that innovators have difficulty
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obtaining the "full" returns to their innovations.2 While market structure provides the
resources,  the  magnitude  of knowledge  spillovers  may be  a  crucial  determinant  of
innovative activities.
The U.S. food processing industry indeed provides  an interesting  case study. This
industry not only supplies a growing array of food of increasing variety and quality, but
also is fraught with product imitations.3 As mentioned earlier, the previous literature
on this specific industry has not linked the three concepts of innovative activity, R&D
investment, and market power in a single coherent framework. Toward this end, our
analysis  applies  event  count data  models  to evaluate the  impact  of both  R&D  and
market structure on innovation counts in the U.S. food processing industry. Firm-level
data, which have been used previously to identify the link between R&D and innova-
tions (Pakes and Griliches; Hall), are utilized in our empirical analysis.
The  contribution  of this study is twofold, apart from identifying the link between
R&D and innovations.4 First, a firm's market share is used as a proxy for market power
in the model describing innovative activities. Baldwin and Scott (rephrasing Schump-
eter)  argue  that  large-scale  innovation  may not  be  attractive  unless  some  sort of
insurance is available to the potential entrepreneur. Oftentimes, an insurance against
the  failure  of an innovation  is the  ability  to  engage  in a  price  strategy,  and  thus
monopolistic power in existing products markets may be a precondition for innovation.
While the endogenous growth/innovation literature has acknowledged the conceptual
importance  of market  power in  explaining  a firm's  innovative  activity,  very little
empirical evidence has been offered to substantiate this assertion (an exception being
Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen).
Second, our model identifies the contribution of the industry's stock of knowledge to
the innovative activities  of individual firms, i.e., knowledge spillovers.  Spillovers are
important because they point to the possibility that there is a market failure in the
sense  that firms  are not able  to realize all the benefits  of their innovative  efforts.
Finally, an added feature of this model is its ability to distinguish the effects of overall
industrial concentration from that of market share on patenting activity. While a higher
market share  for an individual  firm may affect its innovative  efforts, the resulting
overall increase in industrial concentration may not necessarily be beneficial to society
(Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen).
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we offer a brief
overview of the methodological underpinnings of the empirical model estimated later in
the article. Next, we describe the data used in the analysis. The empirical findings of
different versions of the model explaining innovative activity are then discussed and
contrasted in the section on results. In the concluding section, we provide a discussion
of policy implications and limitations of this research.
2The nonrival and partially nonexcludable nature of knowledge often results in technological externalities. Market failure
is thus the failure to internalize these externalities (Grossman and Helpman).
3New Product News reports that the U.S. food processing industry introduces about 20,000 new products  per year. The
preponderance of fat-free, cholesterol-free  processes and flavors in almost all types of food suggests the prevalence of product
imitation practices.
4 A survey by Griliches (1995) identifies three styles of research on the contribution of R&D to productivity:  case studies,
event count (patent) analysis, and econometric studies. The literature relating R&D and productivity growth in agriculture
mostly falls under the last category,  with few insights into  private R&D  and its motivation.  There  are a few exceptions
(Moschini and Lapan, and others), but their focus is on the benefits of private agricultural R&D rather than its sources and
motivation.
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A Count Data Model of Patents, R&D,
and Market Structure
In order to analyze the effects of R&D capital and market structure on innovations, we
adopt a knowledge-production function framework similar to the methods employed by
Hausman, Hall, and Griliches; Cameron and Trivedi; Cincera; and others. These authors
consider patents as a function of both current and lagged R&D expenditures.  Following
Crepon and Duguet, our initial specification of the knowledge-production function is as
follows:
(1)  ln(Cit)  = ao  + Pln(kit),
where  it is the mean patent count, and ki  is R&D capital owned by firm i at time t. Data
on patents  constitute  a nonnegative  integer valued random  variable.  The failure  of
classical linear models for this type of data has been well established in the literature.
Several  authors have  discussed alternative  count data  models (Hausman,  Hall, and
Griliches;  Cameron  and Trivedi),  where  event  counts  are  the  primary variables  of
interest.  Examples  other  than patent counts  include  the number of visits to health
practitioners, and takeover bids received by targeted firms. In our analysis, we consider
two models within the linear exponential family, the Poisson and the negative binomial,
for analyzing patent counts. In what follows, we digress briefly on the description of the
Poisson and negative binomial models before presenting the estimated model.
The Poisson  Model
Typically, the Poisson parameter,  Xit, is represented as ln(Xit) = XiP, where Xi*  is a set of
regressors  [e.g.,  ln(kit) in  equation (1)]  which describe  the characteristics  of a cross-
sectional unit in a given time period. If nit is the observed event (patent) count for the
ith unit during time period t, then
(2)  E(nit Xit)  = Xit  = ext.
Note that  it is deterministic, while the randomness comes from the Poisson specification
for nit. The basic probability density function for the Poisson model is given by:
e _it k
n it e  it
(3)  pr(ni)  = f(n)  =  it
it nit,
The Negative Binomial Model
The Poisson  specification imposes the restriction that the mean of nit is equal to its
variance,  which is a testable hypothesis. The negative binomial model, which is more
flexible, does not impose this restriction. Here, Xit is assumed to follow a gamma distri-
bution with parameters (y,  6), where  y = exitp, and 8 is common both across firms and
across time. Then, the gamma distribution for Xit is integrated by parts to obtain:
Gopinath and VasavadaJournal  ofAgricultural and Resource  Economics
(4)  pr(nit) =  i  -e  tit)d
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which is the negative binomial distribution with the parameters (yit, 6). Previous empir-
ical studies (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches; Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen; Cincera)
using both of these models reject the absence of serial correlation in the residuals due
to  unobserved  heterogeneity  of the  individual  units.  The  fixed  and  random effects
versions of the Poisson and negative binomial models developed by Hausman, Hall, and
Griliches  have  attempted  to  correct  for  firm-specific  heterogeneity  that  is  either
observable  or unobservable.  In the Poisson model,  the specification  of the parameter
changes to  Xit =  Xit ai, where ai is either a random firm-specific effect or is conditioned to
provide fixed effects. Similarly, the parameter 6 in equation (4) is allowed to vary across
firms to develop fixed and random effects versions of the negative binomial models. (For
specific  details on extension and application  of these models to the case of fixed and
random effects, see Hausman,  Hall, and Griliches.)
In our empirical specification  of the parameter  it, two additional  determinants of
technology  are  included.  These variables  are  the market share  of a firm and  total
industry R&D capital:
(5)  'it  = exp(Xit)
=exp(Po  + Plln(Mit_)  + P21n(Kit,)  +  i  +  t),
where Mit1 is a set of market structure variables (industry- and firm-level variables), 5
Kit1 is a set of firm's and industry's knowledge  capital variables (R&D stock),  i,  is a
firm-specific  effect, and u, is a time- (t) specific  effect.6
The role of a firm's R&D  capital in explaining its innovation process has been well
established in the literature (see Griliches  1990, for a survey). In addition, the research
activity by other firms in the same industry also can generate potential benefits for a
particular firm (Griliches 1992). This is captured by the inclusion of total industry R&D
in our knowledge-production  function.
The market share of the ith firm (wit -) indicates the extent of market power exercised
by a particular firm.7As it reflects a firm's ability to mark up prices over the marginal
cost of producing output, we hypothesize that the effect of market power on innovations
is positive.  Moreover,  this variable  can provide,  to an  extent,  a feedback  from past
experiences  in the market.
The question of fixed versus random effects  has been addressed extensively in the
literature on panel models. For instance, Greene (1993) states that "it might be approp-
riate to view individual specific constant terms as randomly distributed across cross-
sectional units. This would be appropriate if we believed that the cross-sectional units
6The NEIO studies of market power estimate the conjectural variation elasticity, which is often equal to the market share
of a firm under certain conditions (Appelbaum).
6 We also report the results from simple Poisson and negative  binomial specifications.
7The market share is the ratio of firm sales to industry sales, PiYi/i  PiYi.
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were drawn from a large population"  (p. 469). Mundlak argues that we should always
treat  the  individual  effects  as  random,  because  the  fixed  effects  model  is  simply
analyzed  conditionally  on the effects present in the observed sample. In addition, the
fixed effects model is costly in terms of degrees of freedom lost. Conversely, there is no
justification for treating the individual effects as uncorrelated with other regressors, as
is assumed in the random effects  model.  Hence,  in our empirical  analysis,  we use a
Hausman test to identify any misspecification  resulting from the use of the  trandom
effects models.
Description of Data
Data for the analysis  were  obtained from three sources: the U.S.  productivity panel,
1960-90 (Hall); "patpan85" patents data at the individual firm level (Hall et al.); and the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) manufacturing productivity database
(Bartelsman and Gray).
The large U.S. productivity panel is unbalanced and contains firm-level data, identi-
fied by Compustat id and the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes,
for sales, employment, R&D expenditures, and R&D stock. 8 This database was searched
for four-digit  SIC codes  between  2000  and 2099  for all firms in the food processing
sector. Based on this search, there were 1,358 observations, with over 110 firms under
the SIC 2000-2099  code  span.  These data formed an unbalanced panel for  1965-81,
but most of the firms have data only for 1970-81. The "patpan85" database contains
firm-level data on patents applied for and granted in each year-again identified by
Compustat id. Data on total patent applications and total grants for the firms are avail-
able for the periods  1965-79 and 1965-81, respectively.
The above two databases were merged using the Compustat id, with only the data for
food processing firms retained (SIC codes 2000-2099).  Of the 538 observations for 50
firms, only 32 firms had both R&D and patents greater than zero  (summed over the
respective sample periods). In this analysis, firms that had neither R&D expenditures
nor patents over the entire sample period are considered noninnovating firms; hence,
the relationship between market structure and patents does not apply. Therefore, the
final sample contained 311 observations for 32 firms (see Hausman, Hall, and Griliches
for  a similar  characterization  of data).  The  next  step  is  to  identify  industry-level
variables for each of these firms. Aggregate sales are available for each of the four-digit
SIC industries from the NBER manufacturing productivity database. This information
is merged with the firm-level data for the key variable-the market share of a firm (firm
sales/industry sales).
Table  1  provides  descriptive  statistics on the  32  firms used  in the  analysis.  The
average  for firm sales is  $1,151.42  million,  and average  R&D  expenditures  is  $3.14
8 Unlike agriculture, innovations are more rapid in the manufacturing industries including the food processing industries,
and  so the R&D  stocks derived by Hall et al. are utilized. Using the data on real R&D expenditures, the initial period stock
of R&D capital is set to the R&D expenditures  in the first year divided by the sum of the depreciation rate (15%)  and an
assumed presample growth rate of new R&D at 5% per year. Thus the initial stock is approximately five times the level of
R&D  expenditures.  The stocks  for subsequent  periods are computed  using the  standard  perpetual inventory equation,
Kt = (1 - 6)Kt1_  +  R,, where K, is the end of the period stock of R&D capital, Rt is the real R&D expenditures, and 6 is the rate
of depreciation.  The major difference between the above computations and those of agricultural  R&D, of course, is the long
lag introduced in the latter (Huffman and Evenson).
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Firms Included in Analysis  (N  = 32)
Standard
Variables  Mean  Deviation
Number of Patents:  Applied for  2.22  3.67
Granted  2.81  4.41
Firm-Level R&D ($ mil.):  Expenditures  3.14  4.62
Stock  18.83  23.37
Industry-Level  R&D ($ mil.)  427.31  149.81
Average Sales ($ mil.):  Firm  1,151.42  1,381.24
Industry  15,996.89  8,571.59
Market Share  0.09  0.12
No.  of Establishments  2,931  1,027
million.  Each firm has, on average,  2.22 patents applied  for over the sample period,
while  the  market share  averages  9%.  The standard  deviations  reported  in table  1
suggest considerable variability in the data series.
Results
Most of the count data  models described in Hausman,  Hall, and Griliches  can be  fit
using GRBL: A Package of GAUSS Programs (Hellerstein) and LIMDEP version 7.0
(Greene 1995). 9 Since the data formed an unbalanced panel, we created a PDS variable
(which is equal to the number of observations for each firm) to identify the groups in the
panel. The fixed and random effects options of the Poisson and negative binomial models
are used to obtain all combinations of results. The results reported here are for patents
applied for in a year that are  eventually approved.  Similar  results are obtained for
patents granted, and so they are not reported separately.
In the first two  subsections  below,  we  briefly  address the results  from  the basic
Poisson and negative binomial models, and examine the relationships between patents
and R&D, and between patents and market structure-including a test on the validity
of fixed versus random effects versions of the count data models. In the two remaining
subsections, we offer discussions on intra-industry knowledge spillovers and the effects
of overall industrial concentration.
9 Negative binomial random  effects models are estimated using LIMDEP.  Convergence is not achieved  for the Poisson
random effects and negative binomial fixed effects models with LIMDEP. Therefore, these models are estimated using GRBL.
The GRBL Gauss programs package offers more choices to compute the Hessian (Newton-Raphson, steepest descent, random
search,  and quasi-Newton).  However,  it does not have the  option to estimate  negative  binomial random  effects  models
(Hellerstein).
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Table 2.  A Comparison of Poisson and Negative  Binomial Patent Models
Poisson Models  Negative Binomial Models
R&D  R&D  R&D  R&D
Variables  Expenditures  Stock  Expenditures  Stock
Current R&D  0.46*  0.73  0.76*  0.89
(0.08)  (0.45)  (0.13)  (0.91)
Lag 1  -0.03  0.01
(0.04)  (0.05)
Lag 2  -0.10*  -0.04
(0.04)  (0.27)
Lag 3  0.55*  0.42
(0.06)  (0.28)
Sum of R&D Coefficients  0.88  0.73  1.19  0.89
Time Trend  -0.10*  -0.33*  -0.06  -0.28
(0.03)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (0.15)
Interaction  (Time Trend  -0.07*  0.04*  -0.12*  0.03
and Current R&D)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04)
Log-likelihood  -394.88  -359.23  -325.58  -311.05
Notes:  An asterisk (*) denotes significance  at the 5% level. Numbers in parentheses  are standard errors
of the coefficients.
Choice of Models and Variables
There are two  choices for expressing the relationship between patents  and the R&D
efforts of firms. Table 2 presents the results from fitting Poisson and negative binomial
models with both R&D expenditures and R&D stock. While the choice of a flow variable
over stock has been widely emphasized in economics literature, the R&D expenditures
may not necessarily represent a flow due to lack of data on the composition of current
R&D expenditures. Moreover, the use of a stock variable may mitigate the need for the
long lag structures that are generally used with the R&D expenditures.
A comparison of the fit of R&D expenditures  and stock variables in a Poisson model
(columns  1 and 2 of table 2) shows that the standard errors of the coefficients from the
R&D expenditures model are smaller.10 However, the magnitude of the R&D coefficient
in the stock model is close to those reported by Hausman,  Hall, and Griliches, and the
log-likelihood value is slightly larger. The negative trend is more pronounced  in the
Poisson stock model relative to the expenditures model.  The improvement in the log-
likelihood value of the negative binomial models  (columns  3 and 4, table 2)  suggests
overdispersion,  i.e., the variance exceeds the mean. Note that both R&D expenditures
10Unless the data are Poisson distributed, the estimated standard errors are inconsistent.  Inappropriate imposition of the
Poisson restriction may produce  spuriously small estimated standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi).
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models share the common feature  of a "U"-shaped lag structure.  In the Poisson model
the mean  equals variance,  while the variance  grows with the mean in the negative
binomial models. However, both models fall short because of the failure to account for
firm-specific heterogeneity that is either observable or unobservable (Hausman, Hall,
and Griliches; Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen).
We report  the results  of Poisson random effects  and negative binomial  fixed  and
random effects models in table 3. As the mean of the patents is not equal to its variance
in our sample, the Poisson fixed effects model is not considered  here. The R&D stock
variable is used in all of the models as opposed to R&D expenditures for reasons noted
earlier. The market share variable wi (the ratio of firm sales to industry sales) takes on
values  between zero  and one.  Its lag (wit  -)  is introduced into the model because  we
cannot account for the feedback mechanism between market power and innovation-a
successful innovation is likely to lead to an increase in a firm's market share. 11
In order to analyze the existence of intra-industry knowledge  spillovers,  the R&D
stocks of all 32 firms in the sample are summed up for each time period (industry R&D)
and introduced into the model. Since four firm concentration ratios are not available on
a time-series basis at the four-digit SIC level, we use the number of establishments  in
the industry (SIC 20) to represent industrial concentration.1 2 These data are available
from census surveys  and are interpolated using the linear techniques  as suggested in
Maddala.
Effects of R&D and Market Structure
on Patent Counts
In the models of patent counts,  if the  association between  patents  and a particular
variable is positive, then an increase in this variable has the tendency to increase the
mean of the patent counts (table 3).
The association between R&D stock and patent count is positive in all three models
(the Poisson random effects, and the negative binomial fixed effects and random effects)
and highly significant in the two random effects models. The parameter estimate from
the negative binomial random effects model (column 3 of table 3) is similar to the 0.45
estimate reported by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches for their broader sample (121 U.S.
companies) but using an R&D expenditures variable. While the Poisson random effects
model suggests a stronger relationship between R&D stock and patent counts (0.73), the
negative binomial fixed effects model suggests  a weaker relationship (0.22). The log-
likelihood value of -289.8 for negative binomial fixed effects, however, is larger than
that for the other two models. While these results reinforce earlier findings, they also
suggest that the patent-R&D relationship in the U.S. food processing industry is similar
to other industries. The use of the R&D stock variable reflects the need for incorporating
a longer lag structure in the R&D expenditures variable.
1' Blundell,  Griffith, and Van Reenen used a large presample history of innovations activity, which is not available in our
data series, to provide such dynamic feedback.
12 The new SIC classification is based on establishments rather than firms. However,  when there is net exit, as is the case
with the food processing  industry, there is some confidence  in the use of these data. In other words, holding the number of
establishments per firm constant, net exit implies increasing concentration.
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Table 3.  Effects of R&D and Market Structure on Patent Counts
~Poisson  Negative Binomial Poissonm  E  s  F  E  R




























































Notes:  An asterisk (*) denotes  significance at the 5% level. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
of the coefficients.
The association between patent count and one-period lagged market share is also very
robust. All of our models yield a positive coefficient, although the size of the parameter
estimate ranges from 0.36 to  0.88, with the coefficients  from the two random effects
models being highly significant (table 3). This suggests that the relationship  between
the market power of a firm and its innovative effort is positive, i.e., a rise in the market
share of a firm increases its innovation counts. This finding also confirms our earlier
claim that food processors may charge a higher price for their output, but a portion
of the  markup  may be necessary  to pay for the  development  of new  products  and
processes. 1 3
The negative time trend is significant in all three models (table 3) and suggests that
there is a general tendency for the patent counts to fall among the food processing firms
considered in this study. The coefficient on the interaction term between time trend and
13  Note that our logarithmic specification  for market  share suggests that  as  a firm becomes  a monopoly,  its effect  on
innovation becomes  zero; that is, if wi - 1, then ln(wi) - 0 (Tirole).
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R&D stock is positive, but insignificant in the negative binomial models. Nevertheless,
the result from the Poisson random  effects model  contradicts earlier results that the
effectiveness  of R&D is declining over time (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches), at least in
the food processing industry.
Of the three models considered for analyzing patent counts, the case for the random
effects models is strongest. Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen claim that the difference
between the majority of firms who make few innovations and the small group involved
in high levels of innovative activity is unlikely to be solely attributable  to observable
differences  across  companies.  Thus,  unobservable  permanent  heterogeneity  is  an
important  feature  of  any  empirical  model  of  innovative  activity.  Although  the
qualitative results of the fixed and random effects models in our investigation are very
similar,  we  tested  for possible  misspecification  in the random  effects  models.  The
random effects models may be misspecified due to a correlation between panel-specific
component  of error and the explanatory variables-a  problem not incurred  by fixed
effects models.
This  can be verified by  a Hausman test.  The test statistic is given by qTV(q)-1q,
where q is a vector of differences in coefficients between the fixed and random effects
models,  and V(q)-1 is the inverse of the differences between the covariance  matrices
of the fixed and random effects models (Hausman). The test statistic follows a % 2 distri-
bution with k (the number of exogenous variables in the model) degrees  of freedom.
Using this test, we  failed to reject the null hypothesis  of "no misspecification"  in the
random effects model, as the calculated X
2 value (2.42) is less than the critical value at
the 1%  level of significance (six degrees of freedom). 14 An additional statistic validating
the empirical  results  is the  correlation between  observed  and  predicted values.  As
reported in table  3, these  correlations  are in the range of 51% to 67% for our three
models. Although caution is emphasized in the use of these types of statistics, in count-
data panel models such as ours, computing measures similar to R2 can be complex and
sometimes misleading.
Intra-Industry  R&D Spillovers
The introduction of industry R&D in the count data models is to test the hypothesis that
knowledge, as embodied in the R&D stock variable, is likely to exhibit some of the public
good properties (nonrivalness, partial nonexcludability)  which result in technological
externalities  (Romer).  Existence  of  spillovers  will  suggest  that  firms  in  the  food
processing industry are subject to a market failure problem in the sense that they are
not able to realize the "full" benefits of their innovative  efforts. The  most often cited
consequence  of market failure is underinvestment in R&D by innovating firms.
The results showing the effects of industry R&D on patenting are provided in table
3.  Overall, the findings suggest the existence  of spillovers because the coefficients  on
industry R&D are positive and significant in all three models. Although the magnitude
of the coefficients varies from 0.49 to  1.22, the case for knowledge spillovers is strong.
While previous studies have focused on inter-industry spillovers (Mansfield; Bernstein
and Nadiri), the results here point to significant intra-industry spillovers of knowledge
14 A similar test for Poisson fixed effects (not reported) versus random effects provided inconclusive  results.
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as embodied in the industry R&D stock.15 The presence of both intra- and inter-industry
knowledge  spillovers  suggests  that knowledge  generated  by firms  in the U.S.  food
processing industry has public good properties, and so there may be a market failure
problem.
Effects of Overall Industrial  Concentration
The market share variable adequately represents the incentives for a firm to innovate.
However, as the market share of a firm increases, it is likely that the overall industry's
concentration increases, because gains to one firm are losses to another firm or group
of firms.  Moreover,  at both  ends [i.e.,  competitive  markets (market  share  - 0) and
monopoly (market  share - 1)],  the incentives  for an individual  firm to innovate  are
smaller than in the case of oligopoly (Tirole). Table 3 also presents the results relative
to the effects of industrial concentration  on innovative activities  in the U.S. food pro-
cessing industry for all three models. The coefficient on the number of establishments
is negative as expected in all three cases, but not significant in the case of the negative
binomial models. Although a firm's share of its market is shown to have positive effects
on patenting, the overall increase in concentration in an industry appears to dampen
innovative  activity in the food  processing industry  (see  Blundell, Griffith,  and Van
Reenen for a similar result).
In sum, this study found that the innovative activities of U.S. food processing firms
(as represented by patents) is positively associated with internal characteristics  such
as the market share of a firm and its R&D investment.  Innovation is also related to
broader industry-level variables, cumulative R&D investment by all firms (positive), and
the overall industrial concentration  (negative).
Summary and Conclusions
In this analysis we have explored two research themes within a single economic model
of firm behavior. Results obtained reinforce the finding reported in the literature of a
positive association between R&D and patents in the U.S. food processing industry. A
second  conclusion,  which  is of  greater interest,  is that market  share  is positively
associated with patents. This latter finding has interesting implications. The traditional
focus of the literature on imperfect  competition has been on measurement of welfare
losses due to departures from perfect competition.  Results obtained here suggest that
those losses may be partially offset by the positive impact of a higher market share on
innovative  activity.  Firms that are likely to exhibit noncompetitive  behavior are also
likely to produce new products  and processes, leading to a greater variety and better
quality of food products for consumers.  However,  results also suggest that there are
significant intra-industry spillovers of knowledge, as embodied in the R&D stock, which
likely may cause underinvestment in R&D in the food processing industry.
15  This is consistent with the observed product imitation practices (preponderance  of fat-free, cholesterol-free processes and
flavors in almost all types of foods).
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A limitation of this study is the claim by  some authors (Acs and Audretsch)  that
patents  may not necessarily  represent  the innovative  efforts  of firms.  Use of trade
secrets  and the differences  in the values of patents to firms provide support for this
claim.  However,  as Griliches  (1992)  notes, patents  continue  to represent  a credible
measure of the innovative activities of firms, until better alternatives are found.
Further research  may focus  on the net gains/losses  from price  markups and  the
counteracting  benefits  from  innovative  activities,  possibly in a general  equilibrium
framework. This is important from the perspective  of federal regulatory policies that
do not discriminate between innovating and noninnovating firms. Such policies likely
may lower the incentives to innovate, and thus hinder economic growth. Additionally,
the  divergence  between  private  and  social benefits  to  R&D  in the  food  processing
industry may be investigated further to ascertain a role for public policy to mitigate
market failure.
[Received April 1998; final revision received  November 1998.]
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